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INTRODUCTION
"Does the first amendment forbid the government to stop propaganda which may
imperil the peace of the world?" This is the general and significant question which
some of us were invited to try to answer in this symposium, and I earnestly regret
that the question defies a plain, direct response. Nevertheless, I believe that a
moment's consideration of the question itself will make it clear why a more piecemeal
approach is unavoidable.
It is too hazardous to generalize about the relevance of freedom of speech under
the first amendment to the international law of propaganda, not because the fellow
who generalizes takes a risk of being a bigger fool only because he is willing to be
wrong about a bigger question, but because "big" questions like this one lack
meaning and clarity and so, inevitably, will the answer. The significance of the
first amendment necessarily depends upon the context of its involvement. In the
problem before us, there are simply too many unspecified variables to make a
categorical "yes"2 or "no"2 equally responsive to all situations. For instance, what kind
of propaganda which may imperil the peace are we talking about: warmongering,
subversive, or defamatory? What is the source of the propaganda which we want to
curtail: government agency, ranking government officer, or private citizen? In what
way is the country associated with the propaganda: as the sender or the receiver?
What kind of control are we contemplating: a treaty forbidding the government
from broadcasting to foreign countries, a statute punishing inflammatory electioneer-
ing, a postal regulation cutting off propaganda from abroad? In what forum is the
significance of the first amendment being considered: the International Court of
Justice, a federal court, or the General Assembly of the United Nations?
Depending upon the particular arrangement of items, one selected from each
of these incomplete and merely illustrative categories, we may come up with equally
correct but opposite answers to the over-all question. If the United States were
somehow before the International Court for having allegedly violated a treaty by its
own systematic government broadcasts of defamatory propaganda into the country
whose legitimate government objected, for instance, our own first amendment might
well provide no defense whatever to the alleged treaty violation. On the other hand,
if a candidate for President were brought before a federal court for having allegedly
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violated a federal statute by exhorting a national audience to elect a man dedicated
to victory through preventive war (the offense being that of engaging in "war-
mongering propaganda"), the first amendment would be his best defense.
So it is that the dramatic general question must be broken down into less
dramatic parts for anyone to fashion a useful response. In their book on propaganda,
Professors Whitton and Larson attempted this task and concluded that the first
amendment really possesses a limited relevance of no great obstructive importance to
propaganda controls.1 Professor Newhouse also noted the problematical relevance
of the first amendment under certain circumstances, although he felt that at least
in certain situations it would operate to block some kinds of propaganda control 2
In turn, I should like to examine three areas of national control over propaganda,
to note certain critical distinctions within each area, and to offer some general
reflections on the relationship between international law norms and the first amend-
ment to our Constitution. The three areas are these: control by the government of its
own propaganda; control by the government of propaganda originating abroad; con-
trol by the government of private propaganda originating within the United States.
Like Professor Newhouse, I am laying to one side those cases in which the United
States might somehow appear as a defendant in an international court, and I shall have
nothing to say about the important question of the status of our Constitution in such
a forum. Rather, the areas I shall be discussing are of concern only to the extent
that our own efforts to control propaganda might raise questions before our own
courts.
I
CONTROL By THE GOVERNMENT OF ITS OWN PROPAGANDA
In their earnest attempt to demonstrate the feasibility of controls over malevolent
propaganda which may increase the peril of conventional war or nuclear annihila-
tion, Professors Whitton and Larson led off with a very powerful statement: "The
problem of freedom of speech in the constitutional sense simply does not arise when
the government itself is doing the speaking."3 The statement was made to show that
there could be no constitutional objection to self-imposed limitations restricting the
government itself from engaging in warmongering, subversive, or defamatory propa-
ganda. What Professors Whitton and Larson must have meant more specifically,
however, was only that there may be no constitutional issue arising from a decision
by our government itself to abstain from the systematic diffusion of tension-producing
propaganda abroad, a statement which is probably correct. While such self-imposed
1 JOHN B. WmTTON & A.RTHuRn L~atsON, PRoPAGAmA: TowARDs DISARMAMENT IN TrE WAR oF WoRDs
241-48 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Wsrr-rorN & LIRsoN]. See also id. at 233-40.2 Newhouse, The Constitution and International Agreements or Unilateral Action Curbing "Peace-
Imperiling" Propaganda, pp. 5o6-26 supra [hereinafter cited as Newhouse].
WHITON & LARuSON 242.
LAw AND CONTEmPORARY PROBLEMS
restrictions pursuant to a given policy may be subject to change through constitu-
tionally-protected political action affecting the policy itself, they would probably not
be subject to successful court challenge by private citizens in the United States
while they remained in effect.
At first, it might appear that self-imposed restrictions equally forbidding the
government to generate warmongering propaganda at home would be equally free
of constitutional objections, and to a considerable extent this is doubtless so: 4 if the
government elects to commit itself to a treaty to abstain from the systematic genera-
tion and distribution of its own warmongering propaganda at home, for instance, it
is difficult to see how private citizens could secure standing in our courts and success-
fully claim a right on first amendment grounds to force the government to set up
a domestic propaganda machine against its will.
With regard to formally-sponsored, government-generated propaganda directed to
the nation at large, moreover, the first amendment may even be used to forbid it,
rather than to protect it. Strange, as it must sound in appraising an amendment
which explicitly forbids abridging the freedom of speech, it is nonetheless arguable
that the function of that amendment implicitly requires some silencing of the gov-
ernment itself. Private political discussion is protected from governmental abridg-
ment primarily to restrain those in power at any given point in time from indefinitely
perpetuating their own power and their own policies through the expedient of sup-
pressing the utterance of ideas inimical to their own viewsY The danger of govern-
'But see pp. 537-40 infra, respecting an argument that the government is obliged to inform the
people of the existence and content of foreign propaganda.
OMadison, in 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (I794) [1793-1795] ("If we advert to the nature of Re-
publican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and
not in the Government over the people."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966):
"Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of
government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such
matters relating to political processes. . . . Thus the press serves and was designed to serve
as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve."
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (x964) ("For speech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) ("Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949):
"The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief
Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 [(1937)], it is only through
free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the
people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of
ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian
regimes."
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 1OI (1948) (dissenting opinion) ("It is axiomatic that a democratic state
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mental control over the public political forum may be practically as great as when an
otherwise important segment of private opinion is suppressed outright, however, if
the government itself commands sufficient means to propagandize so much, so
continuously, and so loudly in support of one view that private voices feebly piping
below the government's noisier din are scarcely heard. A government need not
directly curtail the activities of private pamphleteers, for instance, if it can effectively
displace them by subsidizing the "friendly" press or, better still, by establishing an
inexhaustibly more powerful press committed exclusively to its own view.
At the same time, it is surely doubtful whether there is sufficient strength left to
the doctrine of delegated powers to stop such governmental activities solely on the
basis of a claim that the Constitution nowhere commits to Congress the power to
spend in order to establish an exclusive governmental press.' If standing to complain
were to be found and a more solid constitutional basis for objection to be had, it
would probably be in the theory of the first amendment:
Probably no one would suggest that Congress could, without violating this Amend-
ment, pass a law taxing workers, or any persons for that matter (even lawyers),
to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups favored
may not deny its citizens the right to criticize existing laws and to urge that they be changed.");
Dc Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937):
"The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of
our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity
for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security
of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government."
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (i927)
(concurring opinion) ("Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not
fear political change."); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ('The
First Amendment... presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all."); PAINE, Rights of Man, in BAsIc WRITIos OF THOMAS PAINE
141 (1942) ("[I]t is to a nation that the right of forming or reforming, generating or regenerating
constitutions and governments belong [sic]; and consequently those subjects, as subjects of investigation,
are always before a country as a matter of right, and cannot, without invading the general rights of that
country, be made subjects for prosecution.").
See also JEFFSESON, Inauguration Address, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THoa.As JEFFERSON 317, 319 (Bergh
ed. 1903); MILL, On Liberty, in THE PmsLosoPIY OF J. S. MILL z85, 204 (Modern Lib. ed. 196I);
EDwARz G. Hu~oN, FREEDaOM OF SPEECH AND PsRss IN AMEasCA (1963); ALEXANDER MEIX ujosN,
POLITICAL FaEEDO (1960); ZEcHlaAH CHAFEE, FRE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1941);
Brant, Seditious Libel: Myth and Reality, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. s (1964) (cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, TiHE
LEGACY OF SUPPESSION (i96o)); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1182
(959).
6 Cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (196o); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 228 (1936); New
Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928); McCulloch v. Maryland, I7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(I819). See also NOEL T. DowLiNo & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw CASES AND MATERIALS
368-70 (7th ed. 1965).
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by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their controversial causes.
Compelling a man by law to pay his money to elect candidates or advocate laws or
doctrines he is against differs only in degree, if at all, from compelling him by law
to speak for a candidate, a party, or a cause he is against. The very reason for the
First Amendment is to make the people of this country free to think, speak,
write and worship as they wish, not as the Government commands.
7
And again,
... I can think of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the
First Amendment than to compel persons to support candidates, parties, ideologies or
causes that they are against.8
The first amendment argument for silencing government internal propaganda
is especially compelling as applied to media reaching captive and unwilling listeners.
It draws strength from principles of privacy, as well as from the first amendment:
I am of the opinion . . . that subjecting . . . passengers to the broadcasting of
news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of any kind and by any means would
violate the First Amendment.9
And, from the dissenting opinion in the same case,
When we force people to listen to another's ideas, we give the propagandist a
powerful weapon. Today it is a business enterprise working out a radio program
under the auspices of government. Tomorrow it may be a dominant political
or religious group. . . . [T]he vice is inherent in the system. Once privacy is
invaded, privacy is gone.'0
Thus far, of course, this kind of problem has been largely hypothetical:" the
government has generally contented itself with the conduit of the private press for
primary access to the public, and the Government Printing Office has not been
regularly employed as a pipeline for any particular view. The political safeguards
already built into our system surely provide a degree of continuing assurance for the
future.
The difficulty of securing standing to silence government propaganda organs
7International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (r961) (dissenting opinion).
'Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 873 (196i) (dissenting opinion).
'Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 45r, 466 (1952) (separate opinion of Black, J.).
'
0 Id. at 469 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (95); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (i95i); Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (943); Schwartz, The Mail Must Not Go Through-Propaganda and Pornography, xz U.C.L.A.L.
Rav. 805, 851-58 (1964); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YAL. L.J.
877, 926-28 (x963); Ezer, Intrusion on Solitude, 21 LAw iN TRANsrrsoN 63, 67-75 (1g6); Black, He
Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. RaV. 960 (953).
','The limited effort of the government to "inform" the people via official agencies established for
that purpose during the Second World War, and the resistance of Congress to long-term and large-scale
projects of this kind, are reviewed in ZEcUARiAH CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 727"
34, 752-82 (I947). Our primary official information services today, Voice of America and USIA, provide
information almost exclusively for foreign consumption.
FroST AmENDMENT COMMENTS AND FooTNoTEs 535
supported by the spending power is not an inconsiderable one' even with the aid
of the first amendment 3 and, moreover, the remedy of silence is generally not
the way of the first amendment' 4 It would appear far more likely that the first
amendment might be employed with greater promise merely to establish a right
of equal access to government-controlled publication media for the expression of
dissenting views, rather than to establish a basis for silencing the government from
presenting its own view.' 5 If the amendment could be so employed, however, the
result obviously might tend more toward a general escalation in domestic propaganda
from all sources with the government simply contending for its view in the greater
cacophony of propaganda-a prospect not at all in accord with the direction sug-
gested by Professors Whitton and Larson.
There is another respect in which serious constitutional questions might arise
from positive-law efforts to suppress domestic propaganda originating within the
government. A great deal of this propaganda originates with influential and news-
worthy individuals within the government who simply rely upon the public spirited-
ness and competitive avarice of the private press to reach the public.' It does not in-
See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 31o U.S.
113 (1940); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 1i8 (1939); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923).
"But the involvement of a substantial first amendment issue probably does make a significant differ-
ence. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Oklahoma v.
United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For a
most significant recent case, see Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. i966). See also FCC v. Sanders, 309 U.S. 470 (194n); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942);
Anti-Defamation League v. Station KTYM, No. 66-545, FCC, June 17, 1966, 34 U.S.L. WEs 2718
(U.S. June 28, 1966); Louis L. JAFFE, JtDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATCVE ATION 459, 545 (i965);
Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 635, 659-69 (1966);
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965); KENNETH C.
DAvis, AamNlsTRATrv LAW TRE.TisE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965); articles by Berger and Davis, 114 U. PA. L.
RaV. 783, 814, 816, 823 (1966); Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional ]us Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 73 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L.
REV. 433 (1962); Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HAxv. L. REv. 25 (1962); Gunther,
The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review,
64 CoLmi. L. Rav. I (1964); AL.axANDE M. BICs.EL, TsE LaEAsr DANGEROUs BRANcH-THR SUPREME
CouRT AT THE BAR oF PoLITICs (1962). Without doubt, the single most influential factor is whether
Congress has expressly attempted to grant standing.
" See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (I927) (concurring opinion): "If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of educa-
tion, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
2 A useful analogy may be found in the FCC's development of the "fairness" doctrine and the re-
sponsibilities of licensees under the Communications Act. See 73 Stat. 557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1964); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949); Office of Communication
of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.ad 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 954 (1963) ("Where the government voice is not
the exclusive one in a field, but must compete with expression by private individuals or groups, there
is less need of limitation.").
16 See WmILLIAA H. IRWIN, PROPAGANDA AND THE NEWS 247 (1936); HAROLD D. LASswELL, NATIONAL
SEcURITY AND INnVInuAL FRaaDo1,I 95 (i950). Studies of the government's role in shaping public
opinion have emphasized the importance of relay by the private sector. LESTra MARaEL, PUBLIC OPINION
AND FOREIGN POLICY passim (1949); JAfsa L. McCAMY, GovERNMENT PUBLICITY io6-o8 (1939).
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volve governmentally owned presses or broadcast facilities dedicated to the espousal
of an official line, but it simply counts upon the regular press for its ready dissemina-
tion. Short of efforts being made to curtail the freedom of the private press, the
effective suppression of such propaganda would require the application of sanctions
against the very government officials with whom the incendiary utterances originate.
Within our own municipal law system, however, there are grave doubts respect-
ing the constitutionality of laws designed to suppress such utterances or to punish
those Presidents or congressmen who choose to exploit the advantages of their
offices for propaganda purposes. Even if an Attorney General could be found so
brash as to be willing to prosecute, for instance, it is not at all clear that presidential
prerogatives and immunities could be stripped away to prevent the President from
"going directly to the people" to promote an aggressive war, to encourage the sub-
version of foreign regimes, or to defame foreign governments. Neither does it seem
likely that Congress would seek to impeach him for thus committing some high
crime or misdemeanor, even assuming that it had previously adopted some statute
suitable for the purpose and that the remedy thus selected were somehow placed
beyond judicial review. Isn't it equally doubtful whether warmongering propaganda
on the floor of Congress or on the hustings could be made the subject of punishment
in view of the congressman's own immunity and his own first amendment rights?17
And may it not be the case that these traditional varieties of government propaganda
have in fact played the more substantial role to inflame the public passion with a
considerable tendency to breach the international peace?
To note the public's lack of constitutional standing to compel governmental
officials to propagandize domestically may possibly be useful. But to make this
observation is not to observe much about the manner in which many officials fre-
quently give way to dangerous diatribe, yielding to pressure, duty, opportunism, or
plain impulse. Nor is it to observe anything whatever about the constitutionality
or enforceability of positive-law attempts-within our own courts and under our
own laws (whether or not pursuant to a treaty)-to punish those officials for break-
ing silence.
II
GovER!mEr CONTROL OF PROPAGANDA FROM ABROAD
The issues here tend to cluster about two fairly distinct situations involving
the capacity of government to suppress propaganda from foreign sources. The first
'1 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (i966) ("The legislative privilege [Art. I,
Sec. 6), protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile
judiciary is one manifestation of the 'practical security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature.");
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Bart
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (i951); Spalding v. Vilas, x6r U.S.
483 (1896); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (i88x); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (i95o); Comment, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity From Prose-
cution, 75 YA-. LJ. 335 (1965); WMrrON & LAtsoN 164-66; 2 G. H. HAcyWORTH, D rs-r OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 144-45 (i941)-
FIRST AENDmENT CO ENTS AND FooTNomS
situation may arise from decisions by the government simply to refuse to serve as a
relay station or information center for propaganda originating abroad but not
otherwise accessible to private citizens through private channels. Such propaganda
may be generally inaccessible because it involves information originally and exclusively
gathered by government agencies and not otherwise made available by foreign
sources to private correspondents. The second situation involves foreign propa-
ganda which would be widely available to the public in the absence of affirmative
action by our own government to shut off access (e.g., by restrictions on travel abroad,
by curtailing the mail, and by regulating the penetration of foreign broadcasting).
Quite obviously, there is a broader range of constitutional problems presented by the
more varied devices of control in this second situation.
Professors Whitton and Larson generally foresee little constitutional difficulty
arising from either situation: certainly not from the first situation because, again,
"the problem of freedom of speech in the constitutional sense simply does not arise
when the government itself is doing the speaking," and simply decides not to
speak. But we are here concerned with the effective capacity of the government to
censor itself as an exclusive source of information coming from abroad against the
general objection that a refusal by government to share such information with the
people necessarily prejudices the public's right to know and their right ultimately to
determine domestic and foreign policy with that knowledge in mind. Because
"propaganda" has been defined so broadly,' Professor Newhouse is correct in sug-
gesting that such propaganda may still constitute "information which, by hypothesis,
is 'necessary' for an 'informed' citizenry on matters of public policy."'1  Whether
what is being said abroad is true or false, laudatory or defamatory, it may still
be important to know that it is being said if the people themselves are to exercise an
untrammeled right to determine their own collective response to it.
If Professors Whitton and Larson are correct in their view that the government
18 WmTrox & LaSON 8-11, 62-65, 83, 104. Synthesized from id. at 9, the type of "propaganda"
which the authors attempt to show is forbidden by international law may be defined this way: "the use
of facts, fiction, argument and suggestion, sometimes supported by an effort to suppress inconsistent
material, with the calculated purpose of instilling in the recipient certain beliefs, prejudices, or convictions
which will serve the interest of the author, usually by producing or tending to produce a certain line
of action. ... There is a line which our analysis will try to draw .... The essential feature of this
'over the line' propaganda is that it tends to produce a breach of peace."
Professor Newhouse properly notes the first amendment objections of vagueness and overbreadth
which would necessarily be raised by the enactment of "breach of [international] peace" antipropaganda
statutes. Newhouse, text accompanying notes 65-69. I agree, even while recognizing the possibility
that a court sympathetic to such federal legislation might attempt to rescue it by a saving and narrow
interpretation. The trend, however, is entirely the other way, and it merits mention that broad breach-
of-peace statutes are still tested as well under a rigorous clear-and-present-danger test. In addition to the
cases cited by Professor Newhouse, especially Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), see Ashton v.
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (z966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 552 (,965); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (ig6i); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See note 56, infra.
" Newhouse 507 n.8.
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need not (must not?) share such information or report such propaganda solely on
the grounds that it is illegal propaganda (and not, for instance, on the more narrow
basis that its untimely release would also imminently threaten national security), it
may only be in the strict sense that private citizens may lack standing to compel such
a sharing if Congress elects to deny such standing °
But we have already noted that the government itself is by no means univocal,
and substantial constitutional issues not confined to the first amendment may still
arise depending upon the extent to which those officials on whom silence is imposed
may still choose to speak. For instance, we must surely doubt the efficacy of a
statutory attempt to prohibit the President from releasing to the public incendiary
propaganda acquired by him even in his official capacity. One may also doubt
whether even a subordinate administrator could effectively be forbidden by the
President, on the other hand, from relaying information acquired through his office,
or from airing a vituperative statement based on such information, in the course of
testifying before a congressional committee-especially if he were first willing to pay
the price of resigning from his post. Could a member of Congress be prevented
from broadcasting such "classified" propaganda acquired solely in his official capacity,
either by revealing it on the floor of Congress or by addressing it to his constituents?
In short, may not positive-law attempts to restrict the government from relaying
foreign propaganda again be only as effective as the scarcely controllable discretion
of those within the government? 2
Where the government itself has no monopoly over foreign sources of propa-
ganda, moreover, and where the propaganda may freely penetrate the country to be
received by anyone willing to receive it unless the government acts affirmatively
either to shut it out or to threaten those who would listen, substantial constitutional
issues definitely become involved. To be sure, governmental regulation of trans.
mitting frequencies solely to protect internal communication between domestic
broadcasters and those who would hear them may be necessary, reasonable, and
constitutionally unobjectionable. The foreign broadcaster probably has no first
amendment standing, and the interests of those who might wish to hear him may
nonetheless be subordinated in a neutral fashion (i.e., not based on the politics of the
broadcast) to the extent that natural limitations of the receiving medium require
that a choice be made by government if anyone at all is to hear and to broadcast
within the country without interference 2
1o See notes x2 and 13 supra.
"See note 17 supra.
2 The rationale is drawn by analogy from the the FCC's licensing authority to elect between mutually
exclusive applicants, from the parliamentary order concession explicit in Professor Meiklejohn's writings
[e.g., PoLnC.AL FsE.EDom 24-26 (2960)], and from the assumption that in situations where either the
foreign or the domestic broadcaster must yield if either is to be heard, a preference for the citizen would
be upheld. It may also be argued that even foreign broadcasts over unused frequencies within the
United States might be curtailed by treaty or jamming, to protect the economic sufficiency of local broad-
casters otherwise unable to maintain themselves.
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Sharing Professor Newhouse's doubts, however, I cannot agree with the general
statement by Professors Whitton and Larson that "any country can stop printed
materials at its borders and thereby obliterate almost completely any effect these
printed materials might have on its own people."23 As applied to the United States,
I take this statement to mean that positive executive or legislative action effectively
sealing off the country from propaganda originating outside the country would be
constitutionally unobjectionable, whether or not there may be persons within the
United States interested in receiving such material. But Professor Newhouse is
quite right to note the flavor, as well as the holdings, of Lamont" and A pthe ker2
(both of which were decided since the Whitton and Larson book was published).
Nor is the decision in Zemel " one which looks altogether in a different direction.
Indeed, the fact that direct access to foreign sources may be restricted by limiting
the right to travel under some circumstances only makes it more important that at
least vicarious access to foreign sources, not involving the complicating by-products
associated with personal travel to troubled areas, must not be generally foreclosed.
If it is true that the government has no enforceable duty to relay information
which it receives, moreover, the right of willing addressees at least to receive and to
read what others are willing to send directly to them is all the more compelling.
Need we say again that a central function of the first amendment is to preclude
governmental determinations of the political forum? The amendment safeguards
"the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people"27 and not to the end that
the people may be responsive to the will of the government, not on condition that
that will shall be formed only on the basis of information first sifted by government
for falsehood and dangerous tendencies, and not even necessarily to the end that the
will of the people shall uniformly serve peaceful purposes. "The constitutional pro-
tection does not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and
beliefs which are offered."28 To the contrary, the short-term operative truth, popu-
larity, and utility of an idea for purposes of consequential governmental action are
pragmatically assimilated in the political outcome of the debate which occurs without
governmental predisposition,29 subject only to judicial review. A person allowed
to listen only to local sources of news is obviously without freedom to catch ideas
SI \VmTroN & LARSON 242.
24 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
2u 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
20 381 U.S. 1 (1965). See Note, I966 DuKE L.J. 233.
IT Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (93i). See also note 5 supra.
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
445 (1963).
" "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which [men's] wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
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and to determine the opinion he may then choose to cast in affecting that political
outcome: certainly this is so in matters respecting foreign policy.
The right to hear has always been indispensable to the constitutional utility of
the first amendment, and the decision in Lamont was entirely overdue. Attempts
to close out all foreign propaganda at the borders should therefore be nearly as
vulnerable to first amendment objections as attempts to make it a criminal offense
for one to read anything that somehow gets through. As in Lamont itself, the only
serious issue here is that of securing standing to protest a general ban to the extent
that the material sent from abroad is not addressed to any particular receiver. The
problem of standing, however, should not be insurmountable 0
III
GovE _mNT CONTROL OF PRrvATE AMERICAN PROPAGANDA
Most of Professor Newhouse's paper is devoted to a treatment of this third area:
first amendment issues which might be raised were the government to discharge its
alleged international law obligation to suppress private propaganda originating with
American citizens or organizations. For reasons shortly to be made obvious, it may
be useful to divide this propaganda into that designed for foreign consumption and
that designed for consumption within the United States.
Although the first amendment speaks of the freedom of speech without qualifica-
tion, I believe that an easy case can be made that the government is not constrained
to permit private propaganda to be beamed abroad in conflict with a given foreign
policy which is itself fully subject to popular review. If that policy is, at the time
in question, not to unsettle international relations through propaganda designed to
overthrow foreign governments by arousing their people against them, and not to
urge one country to undertake an aggressive war against another, for instance, I have
little doubt that the policy can also be enforced against private groups whether or
not they would prefer a different policy. Similarly, feasible sanctions are doubtless
available against private American organizations which might seek to operate propa.
ganda centers outside the country but which must preserve some source of support
within the country or which involve citizens who might someday like to come home
without fear of prosecution. The critical distinction, of course, is that such propa-
ganda is not, by definition, interior to the democratic process. It is not addressed to
our public forum, to sear our consciences and to agitate for a change either in the
policy in question or in any other policy or law within our own ideological market-
place. To the contrary, given a duly adopted policy of our own, such propaganda
proceeds to agitate elsewhere in direct conflict with that policy. Nothing in the
functions of the first amendment requires that the executive and legislative powers
over foreign affairs yield so far to private departments of state.
We reach a different question, however, in considering private propaganda orig-
80 See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 3or (1965); cases cited supra note 13.
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inating within the United States and designed primarily for domestic consumption.
Presumably the type of propaganda to be controlled here is primarily warmongering
propaganda, since the other two types are more characteristically for foreign, rather
than domestic, consumption except to the extent that defamation of foreign govern-
ments may be subsumed in warmongering. 1 Here, at least, it is conceded by all
that first amendment issues do intrude. At the same time, even this aspect of the
subject has been introduced apologetically, since Professor Newhouse concedes that
the problem of private warmongering propaganda for home consumption "is of
relatively little real consequence."32  In this regard, he agrees with Professors
Whitton and Larson "that the really dangerous items are in modern times almost
entirely governmental in origin.133  The need to control private propaganda for
domestic consumption is apparently not a question of national survival or of avoiding
significant threats to international peace. It is, rather, merely a need to demonstrate
good faith (i.e., the "propaganda" value of suppressing ineffective propaganda at
home)" 4 and possibly to "anticipate and block the development of any such kind of
activity in case anyone is tempted to try this sort of thing in the future."35
What appears to have gone unnoticed, however, is that the claimed insignificance
of private propaganda tends to destroy the case for its governmental suppression.
Paradoxically, the success of the persuasion that the field of first amendment in-
trusion is trivial simultaneously tends to show that the kinds of control believed to be
salutary would nonetheless be unconstitutional. If the breach of international peace
is the substantive evil to be avoided by propaganda control, and if that evil cannot
be said to be threatened by occasional outbursts of private warmongering propa-
ganda, which is stipulated to be too poor and puny, where is the overriding necessity
which alone can justify the subordination of freedom of speech?" Would the lesser
purpose merely of proving our good faith or of providing a "wholesome" example
be a sufficient substitute? It appears very doubtful.
Personally, however, I believe that a discussion of governmental control of
domestic warmongering propaganda needs no apology on the ground that the
subject is trivial. To the contrary, I am inclined to think that private sources of
propaganda historically have been a powerful contributing force to the development
of war tensions, at least within the United States where private communication media
have predominated.?' Certainly this has been so on those frequent occasions when
- See MANUEL R. GARc!A-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOiR HOSTILE Ars OF PRIVATE PER-
SONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 89 n.42 (1962).
"' Newhouse 507.
83 WrrroN & LARSON 242.
"See Newhouse 507.
8'1 WmrrON & LARSON 240.
"
1 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (I919) (dissenting opinion). See also note 56 infra.
17 The Whig newspapers were a significant voice in America's early war with the British. PSILIP
DAVmSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 225-45 (1941). The years prior to the
Spanish-American War witnessed one of the most dramatic examples of press creation of war tensions.
MARCUS M. VILKERSON. PUBLIC OPINION AND TnE SPANIsn-A sEIcAN WAR: A STUDY IN WAR PROPA-
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the propaganda of the private mass media has served to relay, amplify, intensify,
encourage, and reciprocate the government's own propaganda s
The very fact that the private press has frequently worked in harness with
government, to inundate the public with "facts, fiction, argument and suggestion
... building up incidents or ideas that will bring on war,""9 however, should make
us pause in assessing the probable effects of legislation empowering government to
suppress private propaganda. Before approving any more national legislation os-
tensibly designed to protect our national survival through the silencing of speech40
GANDA (1932); Auxier, Mid-Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War, 26 Miss. HIs-. RaV.
523-34 (1940). In the period before America's entry into the Second World War, the private press
produced a large volume of war propaganda [see HAROLD LAVINE & J. A. WECHSLER, WAR PROPAGANDA
AND THE UNrrE STATES (1940)], much of it reaching the American public due to the maneuvering
of the British propagandists. See HoRAcE C. PETERSON, PROPAGANDA FOR WAR (1939). On various
occasions, statements published in American newspapers have sufficiently provoked foreign governments
that they have made formal protests to the Department of State. See Dickinson, The Defamation of
Foreign Governments, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 840 (z928); GARCIA-MO A, op. cit. supra note 31, at 82 &
n.14, 87-88; 2 G. H. HAcxwoRaTs, DIsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 140-41, 145-46, 338 (r941); 7 id. at
394 (1943). Development of war-tensions by private publications is not peculiar to the United States.
See Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States, 28 Am. J. INT'L L.
649 (x934)-
1 
sThe private press tends to function in harness with the government not only by printing routine
"news" which is released calculatingly by the publicity men of government agencies (see generally MC-
CAmY, op. cit. supra note 16) but also by publicizing the government's views and statements during
times of crisis. The faithfulness of the private press in relaying, amplifying, and reciprocating the
government's own propaganda was evidenced before and during the American Revolution, DAVIDSON, Op.
cit. supra note 37, at 225-45, the First World War, GEORoE CREEL, How W- ADVERTISED AMtERICA
(192o), and the Second World War, FREDERICK C. IRION, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 410-52
(5950). Within the family of government officials, the President of the United States has occupied
the most advantageous position to utilize the private press in carrying the government's views. JAmEs
E. POLLARD, THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS (1947); JAusMS E. POLLARD, THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS:
FRot TRuMAN TO JOHNSoN (1965). Even when the editorials of particular newspapers have disagreed
with the positions taken by the government, namely the President, the public may be more effectively
influenced by the same papers' news columns accurately printing the government's statements. LEONARD
W. DooB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 429-40 (1948).
1 9 WHrroN & LARSON 9-1O.
"'The Sedition Act of 1794, ch. 5o, § 5, 1 Stat. 384 [now x8 U.S.C. § 960 (1964)], was a statute for-
bidding the setting on foot or preparing to set on foot any military or naval expedition or enterprise
against the territory of a foreign state. See note 74 infra and accompanying text. Although the thrust
of the statute is aimed at overt acts and conduct, and although courts have uniformly required more
than mere speech relating to the proscribed act, GARCiA-MORA, op. cit. supra note 31, at 53-58; 7 G. H.
HAcKwoRETH, DIGEsr Op INTERNATIONAL LAW 396-404 (1943), some commentators have advanced the
contention that the statute could be used to punish certain forms of speech, such as "the use of words
to plan, organize, equip, finance, transport or in other tangible ways forward the forbidden venture."
WHIroN & LARsoN 239. See notes 74-75 infra and accompanying text.
The first federal statutes clearly to discourage freedom of political expression were the Alien Act,
ch. 58, § x, 1 Stat. 570 (1798), and the Enemy Alien Act, ch. 66, § i, 1 Stat. 577 (1798). "The Alien
Act and the Enemy Alien Act were never formally invoked but their very existence forced a number of
aliens to leave the country or go into hiding. By their terms these acts expired in two years." x TsOMAS
I. EmEsasoN & DAVID HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 277 (2d ed. 1958).
Working in harmony with the Alien Act and the Enemy Alien Act was the Naturalization Act, ch. 54,
H§ X, 4, 1 Stat. 566 (1798), which lengthened the residence requirement period for naturalization from
five to fourteen years.
In conjunction with the Alien Act, the Sedition Act of X798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, represented the most
serious challenge to the freedom of expression. Section 2 of the Sedition Act contained prohibitions against
speech in either the printed or spoken form. Although S 3 of the act stated that the defendant in the
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said to tend to breach the international peace, we need to pause over the fact that
it will almost inevitably be the government itself which will decide when and against
whom to apply that legislation. Such laws as we may develop will lend themselves
to executive misapplication against a minority press singled out because it is pub-
lishing strident criticism of a given national policy and not because it poses the more
significant threat to international peace!'
particular case could offer in his defense to the libel charge evidence of the truth of his speech, "juries,
with the power of ruling on the guilt or innocence of alleged libels, proved to be as susceptible to prevail-
ing prejudices as judges when they decided the fate of defendants who had expressed unpopular senti-
ments. Only one verdict of 'not guilty' was returned in the numerous prosecutions under the Sedition
Act of 1798." LEvy, op. cit. supra note 5, at 131. Although the number of those convicted (all
being members of the Republican Party) was not large, "it is generally agreed that the Alien and Sedi-
tion laws profoundly shocked the country and were a major factor in the defeat of the Federalists in
the election of i8oo. The Sedition Act expired on March 3, I80i Jefferson pardoned all those who had
been convicted under it and eventually Congress repaid most of the fines." I EMER sON & HABER, Op. cit.
supra, at 278. For a comprehensive presentation of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see JAsEs F. SMiT,
FREEDom'S FErERs (1956).
Between the expiration of the Sedition Act of 1798 in I8or and the passage of the Federal Espionage
Act in 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 [now 18 U.S.C. § 792-94, 2388 (1964)], although no national
antisedition legislation as such was enacted, various laws were employed to discourage free political dis-
cussion and expression. I EMERSON & HABER, op. cit. supra, at 279-84. Some of the normal federal
laws which can be used and have been used to curb free speech are the conspiracy laws regarding the
overthrow of the United States Government, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964); the constitutional provisions
against treason, U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 3; the statute forbidding rebellion and insurrection, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2383 (1964); the law against seditious conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1964); and other laws prohibiting
offenses against the United States, e.g., I8 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1964). See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 141-68 (2d ed. 1941).
In 1917, Congress reacted to the pressures generated by the war and enacted the Federal Espionage
Act. When it was felt that the Federal Espionage Act was not broad enough in its coverage of disloyal
and seditious expression [see 4 A.B.A. J. 3o 6 (i958)], further sweeping prohibitions against freedom
of expression were enacted in an amendment to the Federal Espionage Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (I918),
which was later repealed, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359 (1921). See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra, at 37-41, 50-52,
100-01; 7 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 908-34 (i9o6).
The period following the Second 'World War witnessed even broader legal restrictions on freedom of
speech, most notably the Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1964); the Internal Security Act
of 195o, 64 Stat. 987-1002, 1019-30, 50 U.S.C. H9 781-94, 811-26 (1964); and the Communist Control
Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775-76, 50 U.S.C. H9 841-44 (1964). See also the various federal statutes requiring
registration or disclosure of certain information such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 52 Star.
631, as amended, 75 Stat. 784 (1961), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1964); the Alien Registration Act, 66 Stat.
223 (1952), 8 U.S.C. H9 1301-13o6 (1964); the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. X070 (1925), as
amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-56 (1964); and the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 6o Stat. 839 (1946),
2 U.S.C. §§ 265-7o (1964). See Note, Registration of Groups Tending to Influence Public Opinion, 48
CoLum. L. Rnv. 589 (1948).
The denial of significant non-speech interests of alleged subversives has doubtless affected un-
fettered political discussion. I EmEssobr & HABER, op. cit. supra, at 547-52. Besides the constraining
laws dealing with the areas of access to the election process, of engaging in a legal career, and of the
issuance of passports and freedom of movement, id. at 475-521, there has been restrictive legislation
pertaining to the following: union officials, the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61
Stat. 143 (1947), repealed, eh. 534, § 2o(d), 73 Stat. 525 (1959); aliens, the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 166-273, 8 U.S.C. H9 XoI-1503 (1964); expatriation, the Expatriation Act
of 1954, 68 Stat. 1146, 8 U.S.C. § 148x (a) (9) (1964); and loyalty-security qualifications for employment,
the Hatch Act, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), repealed, eh. 69o, § 4(2), 69 Stat. 625 (955).
"The Sedition Act of 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 384 [now 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1964)] (see note 40
supra), was employed to the disadvantage of the Republican Party. "Republican newspapers were
scanned for seditious material and prosecutions were brought against the four leading Republican papers
as well as against some of those less influential. Cases were also instituted against at least three of the
more outspoken Republican office holders." i EMISON & HABER, op. cit. supra note 40, at 277. After
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Our present predicament provides a number of plausible illustrations of the
danger that such legislation could be subverted in the ends of its application. Under
the definitions tendered by Professors Whitton and Larson,42 much of the informa-
tion regarding Vietnam that is distributed by government and amplified by the press
today is doubtless warmongering propaganda. Whether it is also in the national
interest according to the better view, or whether it contributes to slight breaches of
peace today in order to avoid more catastrophic ones tomorrow, may be fairly
debatable but need not be debated here. In any case, the government has found this
propaganda to be useful, and for our purposes it is sufficient to suggest the unlikeli-
hood that any statutes we might have adopted to control private warmongering propa-
ganda would be applied by the government against that segment of the press which
fully, if sometimes irresponsibly, amplifies the government's own statements and
propagandizes in favor of the government's own policies. If pressed for an explana-
tion, the government could be expected to take the position that such statutes were
not being violated in view of its claim that our commitment in Vietnam is sanc-
tioned by international law.43 Private propaganda which merely supports that
commitment, it might say, consequently does not involve an American threat to the
kind of breach of peace (i.e., the threat of an aggressive war) condemned by inter-
national law.
the Federalists were defeated in the election of i8oo and Jefferson had pardoned all persons convicted
under the Sedition Act of 1794, Federalist newspapers were prosecuted for seditious libcl. LEONARD Nv.
LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CML LIBERTIES 59-66 (1963). In discussing the two thousand prosecutions
under the Federal Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Star. 217 (1917) [now z8 U.S.C. §§ 792-94, 2388 (1964)]
[see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and note 40 supra), and the amendment thereto,
ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918), repealed, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359 (1g92) [see Abrams v. United States, 25o
U.S. 616 (i919)], one commentator has stated that "the courts treated opinions as statements of fact
and then condemned them as false because they differed from the President's speech or the resolution
of Congress declaring war. Almost all the convictions were for expressions of opinion about the merits
and conduct of the war." ZEcHiRIAH CIAPEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 51 (ad ed. x941).
During this period the states were not without laws designed to suppress minority press. In Gitlow v.
United States, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court upheld New York's criminal anarchy statute by
confirming the convictions for the printing and circulating of a paper entitled "Manifesto," which en-
couraged the aims of the "Communist Revolution." Using both the Federal Espionage Act and the
Smith Act of 1940, x8 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1964), the Justice Department initiated the widely
publicized sedition trials of 1944. See MAXIMILIAN ST.-GEoRGE & LAwRENCE DENNIS, A TiuAL ON
TRA. (1946).
Professor Chafee has offered the following four summary observations regarding the sedition laws of
this country up to the Smith Act:
"(i) The persons punished were for the most part unimportant and comparatively harm-
less . ..
"(2) The suppressions of one period are condemned a generation afterwards-or much sooner
-as unnecessary, unwise, and cruel....
"(3) The main principles of the speeches and pamphlets which a government made vigorous
attempts to suppress are often put into force within a few decades ....
"(4) History shows that sedition is often the symptom and not the cause of serious un-
rest.. . )
CAFEE, op. cit. supra, at 513-x6.
4 See note X8 supra.
A 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 474 (z966). But see Memorandum of Law by Lawyers' Committee on
American Policy Towards Vietnam, reprinted in iii Coo. REC. 2401x-i8 (daily ed. Sept. 23, x965).
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On the other hand, such statutes might still be applied to those propagandizing
for our defeat in Vietnam or for our withdrawal from the area. The unhappy
professor who spoke for a Vietcong victory,44 and the draft-card burners dramatizing
their dissatisfaction with our efforts,45 could be described as engaging in war-
mongering propaganda. Their expressive activities might be said to be calculated
to embolden the North Vietnamese to press an aggressive (and therefore forbidden)
war. Similarly, while Senator Morse may be protected by legislative immunity from
prosecution under a statute forbidding defamatory propaganda for his announced
opinion about the character of the South Vietnamese government,46 news columnists
might be successfully prosecuted for identical utterances. They could be charged
with the felony of "defamatory propaganda," utterances tending to bring a foreign
government into disrepute with its own or other people and tending therefore to
increase tension between that friendly government and our own. Identically in.
accurate or accurate statements by the private press about the character of the North
Vietnamese regime, on the other hand, would surely be less likely to precipitate
action by the executive within whose discretion the power to prosecute rests.
The point is obvious and serves merely to illustrate the uneasy feeling Professor
Newhouse expressed in the conclusion to his paper. The formulation of national
legislation may be neutral in its intendment, good in purpose, and nondiscriminatory
on its face. But the discretion of the executive to pick and choose the occasions for
its employment, and the occasional pressure of public passion to have him exercise
that discretion in invidious ways, cannot safely be disregarded. Our own history
should make us aware of the possibility that statutes of this kind may be deflected
from serving norms of international law and subordinated to the service of distinctly
national-sometimes nationalistic-policies.
47
It may not be enough of an answer, in these circumstances, to point out that these
risks are always present in the administration of criminal law and that they are
amply considered in the general provision we have made for an independent federal
judiciary with its ameliorative powers of statutory interpretation and constitutional
review. Care must still be taken to avoid the impulsive establishment of crude laws
while banking on the Court to sort the good from the bad-especially in times of
crises,48 especially where Congress finds legislative facts said to affect national
"N.Y. Times, June 23, 1965, p. 9, col. 3; id., Sept. 13, 1965, P. 9, col. 1; id., Oct. 19, 1965, p. 30,
col. 5; id., Oct. 25, 1965, p. I, col. 6. See 52 A.A.U.P. BULL. 211 (1966).
' See 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462 (1964); United States v. Smith, 249 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Iowa 1966);
United States v. Miller, 249 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), 34 FoRD. L. REV. 717 (x966); Forkosch,
Draft Card Burning-Eectuation and Constitutionality of the z965 Amendment, 32 BROOxLYN L. REv.
303 (1966); Rachlin, Draft Cards and Burning the Constitution, 32 BRooxLYN L. REv. 334 (x966);
Finman & Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and the Words of Public Oficials,
x966 Wis. L. REv. 632.
to iix CoNG. REc. 16527-31 (daily ed. July 16, 1965) (remarks of Senator Morse).
11T See note 41 supra; LEoNARD W. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (I96O).
,"ZEcHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 563 (194): "The Supreme Court,
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survival 9 and foreign affairs,5" and especially where the occasions of enforcement
remain-as they must-essentially a matter of executive discretion. As to the last
of these considerations, it is by no means clear that the doctrine of Yick Wo would
be fully adequate to minimize the risk of unequal application of the law.51
The source of discomfort goes beyond the observation that only once in 175 years
enclosing a multitude of antisedition laws employed in hundreds of federal prosecu-
tions, has a federal statute actually been held unconstitutional under the first amend-
ment.52 It also goes beyond the practical point that Justices such as Black and
Douglas may be succeeded by Justices with vision as different as that possessed by
those succeeding Justices Murphy and Rutledge, 53 or that even the toughest judicial
fibre will sometimes yield.54 The discomfort is traceable more substantially to the
quicksilver quality of first amendment doctrines 5 and to the ease with which a court
might find that legislation dealing with the slow, insidious evils of propaganda can-
not be reviewed for constitutionality by any standard as "ill adapted" as the stringent
clear-and-present-danger test."0 That test, as Professor Kalven so usefully pointed
though much more anxious to support liberty of speech than it was twenty years ago, can do nothing
to keep discussion open during an emergency." CHuaRLES H. PRITCaTT, CIVIL LiaERTES AND THEi
VINSON CouR'r (1954); Alfange, The Balancing of Interests in Free Speech Cases: In Defense of an
Abused Doctrine, z LAw IN TRANSITION Q. 35, 52-53 (1965): "[U]ntil x956, the Court studiously
refrained from any serious interference with government actions against alleged subversives." Mendelson,
On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 828 (x962):
"[T]he Supreme Court has not yet struck down a national measure on the basis of any provision in the
first amendment." (The Lamont case, supra, decided in 1965, is the very first exception.) Schenek v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (I919): "When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (942).
" Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. i (196I); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. io9 (1959); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951)- See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
"°See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936); Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1959); Howard, Constitutional Limitations and American
Foreign Policy, in EssAYs ON THE AmERIcAN CONSTITUTION 159 (Dietze ed. 1964).
51 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, X18 U.S. 356 (z886). See also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and
judicial Review, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 55 (x965); Comment, The Right to Non-discriminatory Enforce.
ment of State Penal Laws, z6 CoLum. L. Rav. 1103 ('96').
', See note 48 supra.
"See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, Tim JUDICIAL MIND 143, 226 (1965).
"' See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 683 (1963).
"
5 Professor Emerson recently reviewed four different first amendment "tests," Professor Kalven sug-
gests that a fifth (associated with Professor Meiklejohn) has come to the fore, and I am certain that
at least three of these five tests (clear and present danger, balancing, and absolute protection) can each
in turn be fractionated into three different tests, with the proponents of each variation quite able to
find suitable judicial authority for support. For references and an illustration of the ups and downs of
"clear and present danger," see note 56 infra.
" The present condition (and content) of the clcar-and-present-danger test remains in doubt, although
the test still has considerable force. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (195z), Chief justice
Vinson, writing for the Court, initially purported merely to apply the test as clarified by Judge Hand's
"restatement." Clearly however, the test as applied by Vinson was not the same test in fact as applied
by the Court during the previous two decades of its adoption, ten years after its first tentative statement
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by Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See Loper, The Court of Chief Justice
Hughes: Contribution to Civil Liberties, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 535, 572-95 (1966); ZECHAIwUA H CHAFEE,
FRE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 357-409 (1941 ed.). For a comprehensive listing of cases adverting
to the test through 1951, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion and Justice Douglas's dissenting
opinion in Dennis, supra, at 556-61, 59X-92. In Dennis, the test as applied to federal antisedition laws
was dropped to one of clear danger as reasonably determined by Congress, with a minimum of judicial
review on the issue of congressional reasonableness and no requirement of imminency respecting the
danger. The concurring opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson clearly state the rationale for refusing
to apply the Brandeis version [Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (927)] of the Holmes test.
See also Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (949)- Far from
Dennis representing "at least a partial return to the Holmes-Brandeis version of the clear-and-present-
danger test," as suggested by Professor Newhouse, I believe that Dennis represented a temporary
abandonment of the test. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 912 (1963): "The clear and present danger test was abandoned by a majority of the Supreme
Court in the Dennis case." Indeed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter spent a good deal of his time in Dennis
attempting to explain why it was impossible for the Court even to entertain an independent judgment
that the dangers meant to be curtailed by the Smith Act were "clear," rather than obscure, remote,
and entirely problematical, and why it was that Congress would more or less be conclusively presumed
to be reasonable in its determinations.
Still, Professor Kalven was not on safe ground in concluding that at least by 1964, with New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (r964), "it is clear that . . . [the clear-and-present-danger test]
has disappeared." Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191, 213-214. References in the Times case (376 U.S. at 273) to
four leading applications of the dear-and-present-danger test [Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375 (1962)] were applicable directly to the Times case itself. They tend to support the
following propositions: (a) even a clear and present danger of mere injury to official reputation per se
is not an evil within the power of government to avoid by suppressing speech; (b) the obstruction
of justice is an avoidable evil, however, and it is imaginable that unrestrained defamation of public
officials might obstruct justice by intimidating them from discharging their duties; (c) but even an
obstruction of justice may be avoided by abridging speech only when the speech in question constitutes a
clear and present danger of precipitating the evil, and (d) police commissioners are presumed to be as
hardy as judges and juries in their ability to withstand criticism without letting it interfere with their admin-
istration of justice; (e) moreover, there was no evidence in the Times case itself overcoming this pre-
sumption (i.e., no evidence of a clear and present danger that justice would be obstructed if plaintiff
were unable to collect his $5oo,ooo judgment) and thus the law authorizing such a judgment under
the circumstances violated the first amendment. The immediate sequel to Times, Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964), tended even more to recognize the continuing vitality of the clear-and-present-
danger test. See Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the
Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Ryv. 1, 7-9 (1965): "The announcement of that test's
obliteration is surely premature." Id. at 9. It is quite true that the very next year, dicta in Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 566 (1965), misapplied the clear-and-present-danger test by standing the
presumption of official hardiness on its head (i.e., the Court presumed that a large but peaceful dem-
onstration in front of a courthouse inherently threatens the judicial process, or at least that a state
legislature could reasonably conclude that this is so, in a narrowly-drawn statute), but even here, in
dicta, the Court felt obliged to respect the test. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 31.
Again, in 1966, the Court employed the clear-and-present-danger test to dispatch a state statute
affecting first amendment rights. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. i1, i8 (1966): "A statute touching those
protected rights must be 'narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear
and present danger to a substantial interest of the State.'" [Quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940)]. For other post-Dennis uses of the test, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443.
453-54 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 272 U.S. 229, 244 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962). For standard criticisms that the clear-and-present-danger test simultaneously provides too
much and too little protection, see PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 42-44
(1961); ALExANDER M iKLFioHN, PoLrrICAL FREEDOM 29-50 (1960); ZECHARIA CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT
AND MAss COMUNICATION 52-61 (1947); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 910-12 (z963); Howe, Book Review, 55 HAuv. L. REv. 695 (1942); Wechsler, The
Clear and Present Danger Test, 9 Am. L. ScHooL REv. 881 (941).
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out,57 has already surrendered on three previous occasions to the rationale that it
has no place when the alleged evils of the speech in question are subliminal and where
the danger is not of dramatic action the imminence of which can be estimated but
of slow and corrosive demoralization yielding to the evil by degrees. On such a
basis, the test had scarcely been accepted by a majority of the Court 8 before it was
partly discarded: first in the area of group libel,"' then for a time in the area of sedi-
tion, 0 and still in the area of obscenity. 1 Whether cases such as Lamont, Brown,
Times, Yates, Aptheker, and Elfbrandt62 indicate that the Court has permanently
abandoned the self-abnegation of Gitlow, Beauharnais, and Dennis" (all of which
Professors Whitton and Larson exclusively relied upon) remains to be seen. The
unsatisfactory state of the first amendment in the field of obscenity, as continued
through Ginzburg,"4 is not a reassuring sign.
Finally, it should be noted that the conflict between the orientation of international
law norms as described by Professors Whitton and Larson and the orientation of our
own political process may be even deeper than noted in Professor Newhouse's very
excellent paper. The assumption of the Whitton-Larson book seems to be not only
that certain governmental decisions are forbidden to a nation but that certain forms
of speech which may tend to bring about such decisions by any means are equally
forbidden to its people. The burden of the book has been in part to demonstrate
that each government has an affirmative obligation to suppress international tension
producing propaganda whether or not that propaganda is internal, private, and part
of a continuing political debate. If the tendency of that debate is to generate
57 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THlE Fiasr AMENDMENT 12-52.
" See note 56 supra.
5 Compare Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), with New York Thmes Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"O Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), with Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966).
6 1Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See WILLIAm E. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
192-93 (1947), for a classic statement rationalizing censorship, never stopping to examine its rife pre-
sumptions. See also WALTER BRNs, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957). C1.
H. L. A. HART, LAw, LiBERaTY AND MoRALiTy (x963). The Court took a turn away from Plato in
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Mr. Justice Rutledge once described the
dilemma presented by attempts to curb the advocacy of "immoral conduct," in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S.
95, 101-102 (948) (dissenting opinion), as follows:
"It is axiomatic that a democratic state may not deny its citizens the right to criticize
existing laws and to urge that they be changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an effort to
legalize polygamy it is obviously necessary to convince a substantial number of people that such
conduct is desirable. But conviction that the practice is desirable has a natural tendency to induce
the practice itself. Thus, depending on where the circular reasoning is started, the advocacy of
polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of law, or be constitutionally protected
as essential to the proper functioning of the democratic process."
C1 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
"i Gitow v. New York, :z68 U.S. 652 (1925); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (x952); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
C"Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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sufficient force within the country so that a change in government policy committing
that country to an aggressive war were made imminent by the trend of the debate
itself, for instance, the existing government would have the duty as well as power
to cut off the debate to avoid the change in policy which might otherwise ensue 5
The duty to arrest interior warmongering propaganda before it can succeed in
effecting a change in the external policies of the government is implicit in the
government's larger duty to avoid the aggressive war which would become inevitable
with the change in policy.
Unless Missouri v. Holland6 were to be radically extended or the Constitution
amended, however, I foresee no way in which the government of the United States
could conscientiously and correctly bind itself even by treaty to the suppression of
interior warmongering propaganda which directs its appeal to the democratic process
and is simply an integral part of a ceaseless debate over public policy.67 At least
this is so to the extent that the enforcement of sanctions would be reviewable in our
own Supreme Court and as long as the Court may be true to the spirit of Times.
It would not be enough that the propaganda would pose a clear and present danger
of bringing about the "evil" change in policy. Nor would it be enough that the
propaganda, discounted by the improbability of its effectuating such a policy change,
would still be highly likely to succeed unless the propaganda could be stopped. The
plain fact of the matter is that the mode of accomplishing the change is constitu-
tionally protected and that the change cannot be resisted by government if it is
sought to be accomplished by means of the protected mode.
The ulterior evil may be aggressive war, but the means employed, by hypothesis,
are only those of working within and through the democratic process immediately to
effect a change of a governmental policy which is always within the power of the
people ultimately to determine for themselves. The Constitution grants to Congress
the power to declare war,6" a power not couched in terms of wars of self-defense or
limited to wars which may be authorized by international law. Within our own
system the first amendment guarantees each individual the right to urge his govern-
ment to exercise that power or to join with others peacefully to press for the election
of a Congress which will exercise that power, as much as though that individual
had called for congressional action under the commerce clause or any other clause.
So long as one's speech is employed simply to petition his government to act, or to
0' The power of the United States government to suppress private warmongering propaganda posing
a clear and present danger of success is defended in WsrrroN & LAtsOz, 233-4o. The international law
duty of governments not to engage in warmongering propaganda is reviewed. Id. at 62-82. The authors
conclude (id. at 156-66) that there is no clearly established international law duty requiring a state to
suppress private warmongering propaganda but that such a duty does arise by treaty, and that there
is a general international duty to suppress propaganda imminently likely to produce a hostile expedi-
tion from within the country.
00 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
e7 But see G~Aci&-MoRA, op. cit. supra note 3, at 88-89.
08 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
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incite others to join him in voting for men who will act, he could not be punished
without abandonment of the first amendment."
Should it make any difference in the outcome if Congress were first to renounce
the aggressive war power (as arguably it has done by subscribing to the Charter
of the United Nations) 70 before it outlawed warmongering propaganda? Probably
not. It is doubtful, first of all, that Congress may completely relinquish by treaty
or by any other means a power granted it by the Constitution. But even assuming
that a given Congress could at least strip itself of its delegated powers (and not
merely forbear exercising such powers) without constitutional amendment, could
it also go forward to punish speech inciting people to press Congress to declare war
anyway, or inciting them to elect a Congress and a President to abrogate the treaty,
reclaim their power, and immediately thereafter declare war? The effect of the
treaty, the validity of its abrogation, and the constitutionality of the decision to
declare war possibly might (but probably would not) present justiciable issues for
review in the Supreme Court, but speech which merely calls upon Congress to take
action which the Court may hold to be beyond its power on some judicial occasion
of its testing can scarcely be forbidden on that account.
The same answer almost surely applies to other forms of warmongering propa-
ganda in the ceaseless debate of public policy. Could a candidate for office be punished
for offering the view that the national salvation lay in drastic action to establish a
Pax Americana under a global empire established by conquest and for urging
his own election with the promise that he would bend every effort in office to that
end? Does the answer depend to any degree upon how clear and present the
danger that, unless stopped, the candidate and others like him will be elected? Any
6°Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 575 (1951) (concurring opinion): "I do not suggest that
Congress could pnhiish conspiracy to advocate something, the doing of which it may not punish."
70 The Charter of the United Nations, to which the United States is a signatory, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945),
provides in article 2, paragraph 4:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Without referring to specific sections of the Charter, various officials of the United States government have
stated that acts of aggressive force are outlawed under the Charter. See, e.g., IAN BRowNtLr, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw ANs THE USE oF Fonca BY STATES 119 (1963); 5 MAtyoRIE M. WmHrITAN, DwosET op5
INTErNATioNAL LAW 778-8o (x963). Article 2, paragraph 4, quoted above, must of course be con-
sidered in light of Article 51, which provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
On various occasions the renunciation of aggressive force or threat has conflicted with the claimed right
of self-defense. See BRowNmE, op. cit. supra, at 264-80. An alleged conflict is evidenced today in the
Vietnam engagement. Compare 54 DEP'r STATE Btmi. 474 (I966), with Memorandum of Law by
Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam, reprinted in III CoNo. REC. 240x-x8
(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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more, say, than a candidate in a southern community could be stopped from urging
his own election with the promise that he would bend every effort to re-establish
segregation? Or than a citizen could be stopped from vocally supporting the election
of a candidate pledged to the establishment of a state religion? The answer, barring
only the kind of judicial oversight which occurred in Beauharnais,71 seems to me to
be a dear and obvious "no" ' 2
The point of this exercise is equally obvious, but I have ventured its restatement
to bring us back to realism in dealing with the capacity of our system as it presently
exists to curtail the more serious forms of warmongering propaganda. In their
book, Professors Whitton and Larson advert to the following statute adopted in 1794,
and still in effect, as an illustration of useful and constitutional legislation:73
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides
or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $3,ooo or im-
prisoned for not more than three years, or both.7Y4
They also develop the suggestion that "incipient steps" toward the support of
such forbidden enterprises, including "the use of words to plan, organize, equip,
finance, transport or in other tangible ways forward the forbidden venture," may be
forbidden by the statute.75 They may well be right, but we need to note that this
statute of 1794 necessarily reaches only such speech as may be directed at private
action taken outside the processes of government to mount a private venture or war
effort in conflict with current policy, rather than speech designed to change the
policy itself. Warmongering propaganda within the United States posing the more
substantial threat today, however, is doubtless directed to move the government itself
to take arms against a sea of troubles. The "really dangerous" appeal from the
private sector is that the Congress should act, that the President should act, or, fail-
ing that, that the people should act to replace them with more determined men.
The cases adjudicating the statute of 1794 provide no precedent at all that exhorta-
tions of this latter kind can constitutionally be arrested. This more substantial
1 343 U.S. 250 (I952). See HARRuY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE Fisr AmENDMENT 7-64
(1964).
"2 The point that, until amended, the Constitution through its first amendment protects utterances
dearly and presently likely to succeed through the democratic process itself is illustrated in the. dictum
of Mr. Justice Holmes: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way." Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(dissenting opinion). See also all of note 5 supra.
73 XNV sroN & LAusoN 238.
74 i8 U.S.C. § 960 (1964). For a brief presentation of the legislative development of this statute
from 1794 to x962 and the judicial construction at various stages of its evolution, see GARcl'A-MoRA, op.
cit. supra note 31, at 53-58, 86; 7 G. H. HAcKwoR.Ts, DiGEsT oF INTERNATioNAL LAW 396-404 (5943).
7r NVmTroN & LA.soN 239.
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threat not only is not reached by any federal statute, it cannot be reached by any
statute consistent with the first amendment.
I cannot agree, therefore, that there are no substantial constitutional issues which
hedge the power of government significantly to curtail warmongering propaganda
within the United States, to control the domestic consumption of subversive or
defamatory propaganda sent from abroad, or even to silence its own officialdom.
Beyond that, I despair of attempts to legislate virtuous speech in debates of
public policy, and I doubt whether the politics of government will permit the
merely neutral application of antipropaganda laws. The possibility of a truly
catastrophic war casts a pall over everything else, and it is doubtless made greater
by the free circulation of malevolent propaganda. Much that Professors Whitton
and Larson have written shows well that this is so, and their suggestions for the cur-
tailment of propaganda across national lines are both sobering and excellent. How
well their other suggestions can carry within the United States, where even a choice
of national suicide is constitutionally a right of the people if exercised in a certain
way, may be more doubtful.
